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Almost everyone agrees that improving education is the key to economic 
development in the 21st century. Schools elevate the skills and knowledge of 
the work force. Strong local educational systems attract and retain businesses 
and pay large economic returns through higher productivity and incomes. 
Education may not be the mother of economic development, but it matters as 
much as anything else, and probably a lot more. 
Not surprisingly, the business community is often one of the most vocal 
supporters of education. Clearly, it needs an improving stock of human capital 
to compete in the increasingly knowledge-based economy. Business leaders 
know they must invest in education because the economy will grow and prosper 
in the future only to the extent that the community cultivates its human capital 
stock today. Most citizens seem to agree with business, with voters often 
backing educational funding over other state and local government programs. 
Hand Middle School in Columbia, South Carolina, a 
city school in Richland School District 1, was the 
winner of the 1999 "Palmetto's Finest" award. Will 
certain property tax-based economic development 
incentives offered by the state threaten the fiscal
well-being of this and other schools? 
Thus, asserting that 
education is a linchpin of 
economic development is 
hardly controversial. Yet 
oddly when it comes to 
public finance, it 
sometimes seems that 
human capital is an 
afterthought, secondary to 
attracting physical capital 
with targeted property tax 
breaks. A potential 
conflict arises between 
school financing and 
economic development 
incentives because public 
education depends largely 
on local property taxes. If and when property taxes are cut, the effects on school 
district budgets are usually felt immediately. Property taxes are the fiscal 
foundation of schools -- in effect, an endowment for children. But in the rush to 
find ways to promote economic development, school property tax revenue 
sometimes has been diverted to fund roads, sewers, and other infrastructure 
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improvements that may build the physical capital base while ignoring critical 
human capital needs and commitments. 
No case better illustrates the potential conflict between education finance and 
economic development than Myrtle Beach (Horry County), South Carolina. In 
1999, a proposal for a large-scale economic development project raised 
awareness across South Carolina and the nation concerning the implications of 
incentives on education. The proposal, presented to Horry County Council and 
the City of Myrtle Beach by a local development company, called for the 
creation of a multi-county business park (MCBP) covering approximately 8,300 
acres. It would use 100 percent of commercial property tax revenues for 
noneducational purposes. 
The Horry County Board of Education, along with local citizens, raised serious 
concerns about the long-term implications of this proposal: How would it affect 
the ability of the district to fund educational services in the district? The 
developer's proposal would remove more than $2 billion in commercial 
property from the school district's tax base. Locked into a 30-60 year plan, the 
district was concerned that this could have a detrimental impact on the district's 
ability to fund education in Horry County. By removing such a large and 
important component from the tax base, the district faces shifting the tax burden 
to other property owners in the county in order to maintain educational quality. 
The Horry County case brought media attention to an issue that has been 
simmering since business incentives heated up in the 1980s. Newspaper articles 
and national TV news stories openly questioned whether South Carolina had 
gone too far in actively seeking new business -- risking future educational 
attainment as its escalating incentives pushed it into fiscal fratricide with other 
states. 
This article looks at the largely unintended consequences of expanding 
economic development incentives in South Carolina. Most citizens, no doubt, 
expect government to actively recruit new business, not only to attract new 
capital, but to create employment. Yet in this article, we argue that certain types 
of development incentives, especially if they proliferate into commercial and 
other property, could be detrimental to the long-run future of public education. 
That is something most citizens do not want. 
It should be stated unequivocally at the outset that education is c mpatible with 
economic development initiatives. Indeed, educational and economic 
development advocates are natural allies: incentives help provide physical 
capital; education helps provide human capital. Both are needed to achieve 
economic progress. By reassessing incentives we create the kind of economic 
future we will require for our children. In the next section, we look at why 
South Carolina has become so aggressive in offering tax incentives. 
South Carolina's Push For Economic Development 
Economic development incentives expanded widely in the 1980s, but to 
understand why they were seen as necessary then (and continue today), it may 
be worthwhile to take a brief look at economic development in South Carolina. 
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For the past 100 years, with expanding educational opportunities and real 
improvements in the quality of the work force, South Carolina has steadily 
increased its standard of living. Figure 1 shows how far the state's standard of 
living has progressed. Note first the sharp decline during the post-Civil War 
reconstruction era, when the education system slumped to its nadir. Then, 
between 1900 and 2000, the state's per capita income relative to the U.S. 
average (expressed as a percentage of the U.S. average) began to climb from 
less than 40 percent to almost 80 percent. As the state's educational system 
improved, its productivity improved, and its standard of living grew 
accordingly. 
Continuing this kind of progress 
in the 21st century will take a 
more knowledge-driven and 
entrepreneurial business climate 
Ñ an economic model that every 
state strategic plan advocates. 
The quality of public schools 
will be an increasingly 
important factor in business 
firms' decisions to move in, 
expand, contract, or shut down 
plants. At the same time, 
economic growth affects schools. Nationally, there is evidence that rapid growth 
puts strains on both operating and capital budgets for local governments, 
including schools, even in the absence of any tax incentives that might drain 
potential revenue from schools. 
So, why do we have incentives? South Carolina, like many states, faces 
continual pressure to propel economic development. In some cases, this may 
mean making it more profitable for firms to locate in South Carolina, where tax 
rates have traditionally run higher than other states. In particular, new capital 
investment in manufacturing is deterred by relatively high property taxes. 
The push for cutting property taxes for businesses goes back 30 years. As the 
Northern manufacturing belt experienced deindustrialization in the early 1970s, 
the state's manufacturing base in textiles and apparel began a dramatic 
restructuring. After peaking at almost 230,000 jobs in 1973, the textile and 
apparel employment base has shrunk every year since, falling to 106,000 in 
2000 (see Figure 2). Thus, the sector most responsible for South Carolina's 
transition from an agricultural to an industrial state was no longer viable as a 
source of secure employment. 
South Carolina acted 
aggressively to rebuild its 
physical capital base, focusing 
on a strategy to attract industry 
from outside its borders rather 
than generating indigenous 
capital through entrepreneurial 
activity. State and local 
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development missions to 
foreign countries bore fruit, and 
new firms opened plants where 
former textile mills stood 
shuttered. 
The success in attracting physical capital to South Carolina can be gleaned from 
Figure 3. According to the South Carolina Department of Commerce figures 
depicted in the graph, new capital investment jumped dramatically after 
economic development incentives expanded in the 1980s. Property tax 
incentives for businesses were deemed to be crucial in luring new plants and 
encouraging expansions. Property tax reductions (through a variety of schemes) 
are believed to be among the most successful incentives because they brought 
manufacturing assessment down considerably and made South Carolina more 
competitive in property taxes with neighboring states. One of South Carolina's 
unique incentive programs Ñ the multi-county business park Ñ started in the 
1980s as the multi-county industrial park and expanded significantly in scale 
and scope in the 1990s. The incentive programs were designed to attract large 
capital investments in manufacturing, but were extended to include smaller 
industrial projects and today can be applied to commercial development, as 
well. 
No doubt attracting new industry and promoting economic growth is important. 
Moreover, incentives need not be detrimental to school finances. To assess the 
impact of new industry on schools, the authors analyzed the impact of adding a 
large industrial component to the tax base and/or experiencing industrial growth 
in a school district on such fiscal variables as the millage rate, local revenue per 
pupil, total revenue per pupil, and per-pupil spending. These factors were 
considered overall as well as in relation to district size. In general, having more 
industry in the tax base appears to have a moderately positive impact in terms of 
lower millage rates and more local revenue per pupil, but the effects are not 
strong. In the case of economic growth, the benefits of additional local revenue 
are modest and more than offset by reduced state aid as a result of a higher 
index of taxpaying ability. Small, less industrialized districts appear to benefit 
1more from new industry than larger, more industrialized ones. 
The problems with incentives emerged when they began to be used not just for 
industrial development (the original intent), but for other types of business. 
Incentives That Affect Schools 
Although the list of incentives in South Carolina is long and varied, the focus of 
this article is the state's incentives that affect property taxes and in particular, 
the property tax base of a school district. The impact on property taxes is 
critically important to schools because property taxes are the primary source of 
local revenue for schools. Other local governments, especially cities and 
counties, also depend on property taxes and are affected by these incentives, but 
not to the same extent as schools. These other governments only rely on 
property taxes for an average of 50 to 60 percent of the local revenue portion of 
their budgets. 
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It is true that school districts in 
South Carolina receive a large 
portion of their funds from state 
sources, so property taxes 
represent only a portion of total 
school funding. The average 
school district in South Carolina 
receives about 60 percent of the 
funds required for its operations 
from the state. This percentage 
varies according to how wealthy 
a district is, ranging from a low 
of about 1 percent for the wealthiest district to about 95 percent for the poorest 
district. But regardless of what proportion of funds are provided by the state, 
nearly all of the funds required to be generated locally must come from 
property taxes. 2 In addition, almost all of the debt service and capital 
improvement expenditures for schools must come from local funds. 
Therefore, since schools must rely heavily on property taxes to fund the local 
share of their operating costs and most of their capital improvement costs, any 
business incentive that affects the flow of property tax revenues is extremely 
important to school districts. 
In South Carolina, the following economic development incentives can affect 
the property tax base of a school district, Tax Increment Financing Districts 
(TIFs), Fee-in- Lieu of Taxes (FILOT), Multi-County Industrial Parks, and 
Special Source Revenue Bonds. The main features of these incentives are given 
below. 1. Tax Increment Financing (TIFs) 
Originally a potential loss of revenue to school districts 
State law was amended in 1999 to allow school districts to choose to 
participate in a TIF or not 
School districts protected and have a "vote" in negotiations 
2. Fee-in-Lieu-of-Taxes (FILOT) -- Outside a Multi-County Industrial Park 
Applies to manufacturing, not other classifications of property 
Allows county councils to lower assessment ratio from 10.5 percent to 6 
percent (and as low as 4 percent in large transactions) without the consent 
of the affected school district 
Suspends ad valorem taxes and imposes "fees" 
Can freeze millage rates for up to 30 years 
School districts generally protected but do not have a "vote" in 
negotiations 
Tax revenue is distributed in same manner and proportion as millage rate, 
which generally protects a school district's revenue from use by the 
county 
3. Multi-County Industrial (or Business) Park (MCIP) 
Multi-county agreement; many have one dominant and one nominal 
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county 
No restriction on land area, time limit, or type of "industry or business" 
Can have FILOT in MCIP 
All real and personal property is exempt from ad valorem taxes, but 
"amount equivalent" to property tax is owed 
County councils assert the authority to determine how the "equivalent 
amount" is distributed among taxing districts, including all of FILOTs in 
the MCIP 
School districts are not protected 
4. Special Source Revenue Bonds (SSRB) 
Are available in MCIPs and FILOTs 
Can lower tax revenues to all taxing entities through "credits" 
School districts do not have a "vote" in negotiations 
County councils assert the authority to determine how the reductions 
affect taxing districts 
School districts are not protected 
TIFs are an important economic development tool, but they are generally used 
for community development in cities and counties rather than direct incentives 
offered to attract new industry. (The original intent of the law was to redevelop 
blighted areas in decaying inner cities.) TIFs were amended in 1999 to allow 
school districts to choose whether to participate in a TIF. Prior to 1999, a 
municipality could create a TIF and use school tax revenues for up to 15 years 
without the consent of the affected school district. This opt-out provision gives 
school districts protection from having any property tax revenues generated by 
millage assessed by the school district being used for non-school purposes 
without the school district's consent. This change has not eliminated the use and 
effectiveness of TIFs. Several TIFs have been created in South Carolina since 
these changes were implemented. These TIFs have included some where the 
school districts have participated and some where they have declined. The other 
incentives are used as direct incentives to attract new and expanding industry, 
and schools have had no voice or vote in their use. 
Illustration of Incentive Impacts: The FILOT 
As the following examples demonstrate, the FILOT within an MCIP and the 
Special Source Revenue Bond incentives pose the greatest threat to a school 
district's tax base. These two incentives can allow a county to redistribute the 
"fees" (tax revenues) generated by the taxing entities in any way they want, 
regardless of the relative share of the millage assessed by the taxing entities. 
That is, the school district is not guaranteed that it will receive its fair share 
(prorated share) of taxes from the property (regardless of the assessment ratio). 
The following example may help illustrate this concept of "prorated" share. 
First, assume a manufacturing company invests $10 million, and the property is 
outside any municipality, is not in an MCIP, and does not negotiate a FILOT 
agreement. Assume the millage rate in the county is 70 mills and the school 
district's millage is 140 mills, for a total of 210 mills. The county's share of the 
total millage assessed on property is 33 percent (70/210 = 33 percent) and the 
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school district's share is 67 percent (140/210 = 67 percent). Without a FILOT 
agreement, the company's property will be assessed at the constitutionally 
established 10.5 percent rate. The company's property will have an assessed 
value of $1,050,000 ($10,000,000 x .105 = $1,050,000). The company will pay 
a total of $220,500 in county property taxes Ñ $73,500 in county taxes 
($10,000,000 x .105 x .070 = $73,500) and $147,000 in local school taxes 
($10,000,000 x .105 x .140 = $147,000). The school district will receive 67 
percent of the taxes paid by the company Ñ exactly in proportion to its prorated 
share of the total millage rate in the county. 
If it is assumed that the company negotiates a FILOT agreement and the 
company's property is assessed at 6.0 percent, the company's property will have 
an assessed value of $600,000 ($10,000,000 x .06 = $600,000). The company 
will pay a total of $126,000 in county property taxes Ñ $42,000 in county taxes 
($10,000,000 x .06 x .070 = $42,000) and $84,000 in local school taxes 
($10,000,000 x .06 x .140 = $84,000). 
Even though the company's assessment ratio is reduced so that it pays 43 
percent less taxes, the school district will still receive 67 percent 
($84,000/$126,000 = 67 percent) of the taxes paid by the company Ñ exactly in 
proportion to its prorated share of the total millage rate in the county (67 
percent). 
The ability to reduce the overall property tax liability of the manufacturing 
company is the intent of the law, because South Carolina's property taxes on 
manufacturing property are the highest among our neighboring states. Even 
when a company negotiates an assessment ratio of 6 percent, the firm's property 
taxes will still be higher in South Carolina than in North Carolina or Georgia. 
When the law was first passed in the late 1980s, the incentive was only 
available to companies investing at least $85 million or more. However, the 
minimum amount of investment for a company to be eligible has been lowered 
several times over the last 10 years and is now only $5 million. In fact, in six 
extremely economically distressed counties, a minimum investment of only $1 
million is enough to be eligible for incentives. This reduction in the minimum 
investment level has led to a proliferation of FILOT agreements across the state. 
The Multi-County Industrial Park: The Horry County Experience 
The proliferation of FILOT agreements would not be as big a concern to the 
school districts and as great a threat to their tax base if school districts were 
guaranteed that they would always receive their prorated share of the property 
tax revenues. The FILOT within an MCIP and the SSRB incentives, however, 
do not provide school districts this protection. The Ho Horry County case offers 
a good illustration of how the current laws allow a county government to 
unilaterally decide how the total property tax revenues are to be distributed and 
ultimately to divert school funds from school purposes and preclude schools 
from receiving their prorated share of taxes. 
In the spring of 1999, the Horry County Council received a proposal from 
Burroughs & Chapin, a large, local development company, to create an MCIP 
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(now called a Multi-County "Business" rather than "Industrial" Park) covering 
approximately 4,000 acres in the county and the City of Myrtle Beach. Projects 
included in the proposal changed over time, but the principal one was the 
construction of "the Mall of South Carolina." 
The proposal would lock in the MCIP for up to 30 years with an option to 
renew for another 30 years, facilitate the annexation of several thousand acres 
of land into the City of Myrtle Beach, freeze zoning, and limit impact fees in the 
Park. However, the most important aspect of the proposal to the Horry County 
School District was that it called for the use of 100 percent of commercial 
property tax revenues from the $2 billion of investment to be diverted to 
noneducational purposes. Note also that the development was not an industrial 
project (it was primarily a shopping mall) and that it was not in an economically 
distressed area. 
Under the original proposal, the school district would not receive its prorated 
share of revenues from the property (estimated to be 56.1 percent) but was to 
receive zero revenues (0 percent). Using the MCIP and SSRB laws, the 
proposal called for the county to redistribute tax revenues generated by the 
school district's millage (113 mills) away from the school district and use them 
for nonschool purposes such as road, sewer, water, and other infrastructure 
improvements. The county estimated that if the school district received its 
prorated share of the property tax revenues, the school district would receive 
more than $214 million during the first 20 years of the MCIP. However, under 
the county's plan, the district would receive nothing,.e., would lose a potential 
$214 million. The original proposal has been amended, and the county now 
proposes to redistribute only a share of the school district's revenue away from 
the district, not all of it. Under the current proposal, about $25 million of the 
school district's prorated share would be redistributed by the county to 
nonschool purposes (during the first 20 years of the 35-year MCIP). However, 
the school district is not protected from future amendments to the agreement by 
the county council. 
Other Agreements 
The Horry County case is a good example of how the school districts are not 
guaranteed that they will receive their prorated share of revenues from an 
economic development project as these laws are currently written. But Horry 
County is not the only current example. Another county in South Carolina was 
recently successful in attracting a major economic development project to its 
area. The company reportedly invested more than $600 million. Because the 
investment was more than $400 million, the company was eligible to negotiate a 
FILOT assessment ratio of 4 percent, which it did. Assuming $600 million in 
capital investment, an assessment ratio of 4 percent, and the 1998 average 
millage rate in the county of 225 mills, the company would pay approximately 
$5.4 million a year in FILOT fees (property taxes). Of this $5.4 million, the 
school district would receive approximately $3.0 million. 
However, the FILOT agreement negotiated by the county council requires the 
company to pay a net amount of only $900,000 in fees per year to the county for 
the next 20 years, and no fees at all for years 21-30. This fee agreement is 
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equivalent to an assessment ratio of about 6/10 of 1 percent. The county issued 
about $15 million in SSRBs for improvements for the company. In essence, the 
county allowed the company to use its own tax payments to pay for some of its 
development costs, and the school district's millage was used to generate about 
two-thirds of these funds. According to the documents filed with the county, it 
is unclear whether the school district will receive any revenues from the $600 
million investment. By comparison, Union Camp invested about $600 million 
in a facility in Richland County in 1992. This firm has paid over $41 million in 
fees in the seven years since it signed a FILOT, an average of almost $6 million 
a year. 
As part of a research project, the 46 counties in South Carolina were requested 
through a Freedom of Information Request (FOI) to provide documentation on 
all FILOT, MCIP, and SSRB agreements that have been negotiated in their 
respective counties. To date, only half of the counties have responded to the 
request. However, based on the responses, the above examples are not 
exceptions but are fairly typical of many of the agreements counties are 
negotiating. 
Growth in Use of FILOTs 
The total fiscal impact of these incentives on the state's school districts is very 
difficult to determine. At the present time, there are no statewide requirements 
for counties to report the creation and use of multi-county industrial parks or the 
use of special source revenue bonds. The South Carolina Department of 
Revenue (SCDOR) collects data regarding FILOT agreements, but does not 
publish detailed data on the agreements. 
We do know that the frequency of companies negotiating FILOT agreements 
has increased dramatically in recent years. According to data from the SCDOR, 
there have been over 320 FILOT agreements negotiated since the law was 
passed in 1987. Since that time, the state has received approximately $226 
million from companies which entered into FILOT agreements. In 1998, the 
state received about $61 million in fees. The SCDOR reports that there are 
about 50 new agreements each year. 
The minimum amount of investment required to be eligible to enter into a 
FILOT has been reduced from the original $85 million -- first to $45 million in 
the early 1990s, then to $5 million in 1995. This change has led to wider use of 
the incentive and has, for most practical purposes, eliminated the 10.5 percent 
assessment on new industrial property. At $5 million, nearly any new capital 
investment by a manufacturer will be eligible for a FILOT. With the tremendous 
competition for new investment, most county councils will be compelled to 
offer the lower 6 percent assessment ratio. 
Based on data from the SCDOR, during the five-year period from 1989 to 1994, 
there were about five FILOT agreements negotiated per year. The average 
amount of capital investment for these projects was about $157 million, and the 
average fee paid by these companies in 1998 was about $1 million. This 
contrasts sharply with the four-year period from 1995 to 1998 during which 
there were about 75 FILOT agreements negotiated per year. The average 
9 of 12 6/21/2007 6:35 PM 
      
    
            
            
     
          
             
           
            
           
        
           
           
          
           
          
            
            
             
       
            
            
             
             
          
             
         
           
            
            
            
             
            
           
            
           
       
          
              
            
            
             
          
         
          
Education and Economic Development in South Carolina http://www.strom.clemson.edu/teams/ced/edecdevsc/ 
amount of capital investment for these 300 or so FILOTs was about $15 
million, and the average fee paid by these companies in 1998 was about 
$130,000. 
Estimated Revenue Losses from FILOT Agreements 
Unfortunately, the lack of sufficient data prohibits a comprehensive analysis of 
the tax revenues that school districts have not received. At this time, the only 
data available are the approximate number of agreements and the total fees 
collected. To accurately determine the lost revenues, it is necessary to know the 
exact assessment ratios negotiated, the exact length of terms of the agreements, 
the exact millage rates incorporated in the agreements, etc. 
A preliminary estimate of the total school revenues that would have been 
collected in the state can be made using available data. The methodology 
incorporated in this analysis assumes average millage rates for school districts, 
counties, and cities. These averages are those published in the South Carolina 
Budget and Control Board's June 1999 edition of "1998 Local Government 
Finance Report, Fiscal Years 1991 to 1997." This analysis assumes that all fee 
agreements were negotiated from 10.5 percent to 6 percent. It also assumes that 
all of the property included in the FILOT was in unincorporated areas of the 
counties (industrial property is generally outside city limits). 
Statewide, the average county millage rate in FY 1997 was 54.5 mills. The 
average school millage rate in FY 1997 was 136.3 mills. The school millage 
represents 71.4 percent of the total millage burden on real property. Of the $226 
million in fees collected to date, an estimated 71.4 percent was generated by the 
millage rates assessed by the schools. Assuming the school districts received 
their prorated share of the fees generated from the total millage applied to the 
FILOT (71.4 percent), the schools would have received approximately $161.4 
million of the $226 million in fees. The county governments would have 
received 28.6 percent, or approximately $64.6 million over the last 10 years or 
so. 
However, if there were no FILOT agreements in place, the real and personal 
property would have been assessed at the 10.5 percent ratio rather than the 
FILOT-lowered ratio of 6 percent. If this had been the case, the property that 
has generated the $226 million in fees since 1987 would have generated $395.5 
million, instead. Of the $395 million, school districts would have collected 71.4 
percent, or $282.4 million Ð about $121 million more than they received under 
the FILOT agreements. In 1998 alone, school districts would have received an 
additional $52.5 million more than they actually did. 
It must be noted, however, that the economic development community argues 
that the schools did not forgo any revenue. They argue that if the incentives had 
not been offered to the companies, then the companies would have located in 
another state, and the school districts would have received none of the roughly 
$161 million that they did receive. There is substantial evidence that this is the 
case in many of the larger economic development projects. South Carolina's 
property taxes on manufacturing investments are substantially higher than our 
neighboring states. Without some method of offsetting the higher property tax 
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burden on manufacturing, South Carolina would be at a distinct disadvantage 
relative to its neighbors. 
It appears that as long as the school districts receive their prorated share of the 
fees a company pays, regardless of whether the assessment ratio is 10.5 percent, 
6 percent, or even 4 percent, the burden on the school districts from any 
reduction in assessment ratios will be on an relatively equitable basis with the 
other local taxing entities. However, even this statement needs to be qualified 
since as was stated earlier, other local governments such as counties and cities 
are less dependent on property taxes than schools. 
Conclusion 
Property tax incentives no doubt were put in place with the best of intentions. 
But so was kudzu. That notorious vine covering the Southeastern United States 
was planted to halt soil erosion; incentives were put in place to halt industrial 
erosion. Like kudzu, however, development incentives have spread to areas 
where they were not originally intended. Fortunately, it is still possible to prune 
them back to where they are truly effective in helping to improve South 
Carolina's standard of living. 
Every incentive that lowers a company's tax payments needs to be evaluated on 
a cost-benefit basis to assess the incremental burden placed on the schools and 
the local government by the new company and their employees. That way we 
can ensure the state's human capital needs will not be shortchanged as the state 
builds its physical capital. 
Of most concern to school financing in South Carolina is the use of FILOT 
agreements within Multi-County Industrial Parks and Special Source Revenue 
Bonds incentives. Here, school districts are not guaranteed that they will always 
receive their prorated share of the property tax revenues since the county 
council negotiates the agreement and does not have to notify or have consent 
from the school district. Instead, it is possible to divert all or a portion of 
revenues that would have gone to the schools to support SSRB or other county 
expenditures. With SSRBs, funds from the bonds are then used to support the 
infrastructure investment associated with the development project (roads, sewer 
lines, etc.). The much-publicized case in Horry County involves just this type of 
development proposal. 
It is very difficult to estimate the impact of these incentives on the state's school 
districts. Preliminary projections estimate that school district revenues would 
have been more than $121 million greater than they were had all manufacturing 
property been assessed at the normal 10.5 percent rather than the lower 6 
percent allowed by FILOTs. But at the present time, there are no statewide 
requirements for counties to report the creation and use of MCIPs or the use of 
SSRBs. Data are thus unavailable to even begin such an effort. Further, there is 
no definitive answer to the development community's argument that without the 
incentive, the schools would have received no funds since the companies would 
have located in other states. It is clear, however, that the use of FILOTs within 
MCIPs and using SSRBs put the schools in double jeopardy in that not only is 
the pie smaller, but they are likely to receive an even smaller share of that pie Ð 
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all without the school board's knowledge or consent. Other Southeastern states 
have expanded their use of incentives (for example, North Carolina, Georgia, 
and Tennessee), but none has used a Multi-County Industrial Park in 
combination with Special Source Revenue Bonds as South Carolina has. 
In the 2001 South Carolina legislative session, it is likely that proposals will be 
considered protecting school taxes within Multi-County Industrial (Business) 
Parks. The South Carolina School Boards Association and the state's 
Association of Counties have been drafting a bill concerning these expanding 
incentives. The School Boards Association has argued for a guarantee of 75 
percent of its tax revenue, with the rest available for incentive deals. It also 
insists that incentive awards adhere to the original aim of the legislation: to 
attract manufacturing (rather than commercial development). The School 
Boards Association has become increasingly aware of the potential impacts on 
local school finance and now finds it necessary to advocate the interests of 
children as the incentives spread to cover more and more of the economy. 
As South Carolina and other states re-examine incentive programs, it is 
important to recognize that many positive arguments remain in favor of 
industrial recruitment and an active economic development agenda at the state 
and local level. Incentives may have a positive differentiating effect on business 
location decisions, especially when the characteristics of alternative locations 
(say, Greenwood, South Carolina and Mayberry, North Carolina) are otherwise 
similar. In addition, incentives bring fiscal benefits that outweigh the costs, 
while spurring employment growth at the same time. No one would want to 
deny a locality the prospect of good jobs if they are created at no cost to state 
and local tax entities (at some level of positive fiscal benefits). After all, the 
future well-being of children is ensured not by education alone, but by an 
expanding and prospering economy, as well. 
Dr. Douglas P. Woodward is Director of the Division of Research and 
Associate Professor of Economics in The Darla Moore School of Business at 
the University of South Carolina. Dr. Harry W. Miley, Jr ., owner of Miley and 
Associates, Inc. in Columbia, South Carolina, is an economist and consultant. 
Dr. Holley Hewitt Ulbrich is Alumni Distinguished Professor Emerita of 
Economics at Clemson University. 
Endnotes 
1Hefner, Frank L., Randolph C. Martin, Harry W. Miley, Jr., Holley Hewitt 
Ulbrich, and Douglas P. Woodward, An Analysis of the Impacts of Property 
Tax-Based Economic Development Incentives on School Districts in South 
Carolina, prepared for the South Carolina Schools Boards Association, March 
2000. 
2School districts receive a small amount of local funds from interest on funds 
on deposit, rental of facilities, fees, etc. 
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